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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF UNIVERSITY PATENT 
ACTIVITY 
CHRISTOPHER J. RYAN, JR. & BRIAN L. FRYE**  
 
 
Since 1980, a series of legislative acts and judicial decisions have affected the 
ownership, scope, and duration of patents. These changes have coincided with 
historic increases in patent activity among academic institutions. 
This article presents an empirical study of how changes to patent policy 
precipitated responses by academic institutions, using spline regression functions 
to model their patent activity. We find that academic institutions typically reduced 
patent activity immediately before changes to the patent system, and increased 
patent activity immediately afterward. This is especially true among research 
universities. In other words, academic institutions responded to patent incentives 
in a strategic manner, consistent with firm behavior, by reacting to the 
preferences of internal coalitions to capture unrealized economic value in 
intellectual property.  
                                           
** Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., American Bar Foundation & AccessLex Institute Doctoral 
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Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., New York 
University School of Law; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute; B.A, University of California, 
Berkeley. This article was presented at the Searle Center Roundtable on Patents and Technology 
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University patent activity, as a response to patent law changes, carries important 
economic and normative implications. The patent system uses private economic 
incentives to promote innovation, but academic institutions are charitable 
organizations intended to promote the public good. This study demonstrates that 
patent incentives may have encouraged academic institutions to invest in 
patentable innovation—in ways that potentially limit access to innovation—in 
order to internalize private economic value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since in the last quarter of the 20th Century, the United States patent system 
has been in a state of flux, influencing not only patent law but the incentives 
underlying invention and patent ownership. A series of legislative acts and judicial 
decisions, beginning in 1980, have affected the ownership, scope, and duration of 
patents. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act enabled academic institutions to patent 
inventions created from federally-sponsored research.1 In 1994, Congress extended 
the maximum duration of a United States patent from 17 to 20 years for certain 
patents, increasing the monopolistic value of patent protection.2 And in 2011, the 
America Invents Act shifted the patent system from a first-to-invent standard to a 
first-to-file system.3 These changes have impacted all inventors but especially 
those at academic institutions, where research is a multi-billion dollar industry; 
perhaps relatedly, these changes have coincided with historic increases in patent 
activity among academic institutions. 
This patent activity is not necessarily unexpected, inefficient, or 
objectionable. After all, academic institutions are charitable organizations and 
intended to promote the public good of innovation, among other things. Many 
academic institutions, especially research universities, rely on significant federal 
investment to support research that promotes the dissemination of knowledge, 
disclosure of new knowledge, and importantly, innovation. In theory, the patent 
system could do even more to encourage academic institutions to invest far greater 
resources in innovation. 
However, university patent activity has important economic and normative 
implications. The patent system uses private economic incentives to promote 
innovation. Accordingly, it creates an incentive for universities to overinvest in 
patentable innovation and limit access to innovation, in order to internalize private 
economic value. This is especially troubling because universities may use publicly-
funded research to generate patentable innovations for private gain. Thus, concerns 
about transparency and efficiency arise when considering the extent from which 
universities may ultimately derive private monetary benefit from public 
investment, especially given that universities lack the capacity to bring an 
                                           
1 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 
3015, 3019 (1980). 
2 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994)). 
3 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
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invention to market.4 That is, as a non-practicing entity, in order to internalize the 
economic value of their research, universities must acquire patent protection over 
their inventions. However, because they do not have the capacity to bring their 
inventions to market, universities can and do use public funds to produce research 
yielding patents that are worthless or, worse yet, transfer their patents rights to 
patent assertion entities rather than practicing entities, producing externalities and 
inefficiency in the patent system.5 
While the purposes of the patent system are manifold, these sorts of 
behaviors undercut the argument that patents contribute to innovation. Thus, there 
is a founded concern that academic institutions have responded to patent incentives 
in ways that may actually limit access to innovation. Yet, this concern is not the 
only cause for unease about inefficient responses to patent incentives.6 For 
example, most of the patent infringement actions heard in a handful of district 
courts that have been described as engaging in forum selling—being a friendly 
forum for cases filed by patent assertion entities that choose the forum based on its 
                                           
4 See generally STUART W. LESLIE, THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN SCIENCE: THE MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL ACADEMIC COMPLEX AT MIT AND STANFORD (1993); CHRISTOPHER P. LOSS, 
BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 
20TH CENTURY 224-25 (2012). 
5 See generally DAVID MOWERY, ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2015) 
(noting the trend of universities to transfer patent rights to patent assertion entities in recent 
years); Donald S. Siegel, David Waldman & Albert Link, Assessing the Impact of 
Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer 
Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 Research Pol’y 27 (2003) (analyzing productivity in university 
technology transfer offices and finding that many are only successful at litigating infringement, 
not bringing the technology to market); GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE 
UNIVERSITY (1990) (exploring university patent transfer after the Bayh-Dole Act). 
6 For instance, the Supreme Court recently limited the scope of patent venue in its unanimous 
decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods, which was motivated by flagrant “forum selling” in the 
district courts. TC Heartland vs. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). For the 
Federal Circuit’s decision, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, see TC Heartland vs. 
Kraft Foods Group Brands, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Forum selling is an issue many 
scholars have identified as increasing the costs to innovation. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye & 
Christopher J. Ryan Jr., Fixing Forum Selling, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2017); Gregory 
Reilly & D. Klerman, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL L. REV. 241 (2016); Chester S. Chuang, 
Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065 (2011); Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue 
Transfer in Patent Cases: Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 61 (2010); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 194 (2007). 
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pro-plaintiff bias.7 Many observers are concerned that the concentration of patent 
assertion activity in certain district courts has increased the cost of innovation.8  
Similarly, there is legitimate concern that universities contribute to cost and 
inefficiency by: (1) using public funds to support research that results in often 
useless patents; or (2) providing the instrumentality for non-practicing entities to 
increase the cost of innovation. That is, universities may participate in driving up 
the cost of innovation by aggregating patent protection for inventions that are 
likely to have little market value or that they cannot bring to market and must 
transfer, even to other non-practicing entities. This article is the first in a series of 
papers to investigate the relationship between universities and the patent system. In 
particular, this article addresses whether universities can be said to aggregate 
patent protection for their inventions systematically or monopolistically, which 
may indicate their role in increasing the cost of innovation. The discussion and 
results, below, suggests that academic institutions have responded to patent policy 
changes not in a manner consistent with firm behavior, by accruing property rights 
when incentivized by patent policy changes to do so, but also by strategically 
holding out in order to reap greater monopolistic benefit under anticipated patent 
regime changes, which may have exacerbated the problem of increasing the cost of 
innovation. 
I 
THE PATENT SYSTEM 
The purposes of the patent system are several, but the primary purpose is to 
promote technological innovation, or rather, to “promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective . . . Discoveries.”9 While some scholars have questioned the efficiency 
                                           
7 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case 4-27 (Stanford Public Law, 
Working Paper No. 1597919, 2010), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/260028/doc/slspublic/ssrn-id1597919.pdf; Li Zhu, 
Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket Docket, 11 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 901 (2010); Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the 
Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 
(2006). 
8 See, e.g., Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357 (2012); 
Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 697 (2011). 
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also, A Brief History of Patent Law of the United States, 
LADAS & PARRY, http://ladas.com/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/ (May 
7, 2014). In this article, the term “patent” is used to refer exclusively to utility patents. While the 
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of the patent system, and other scholars have suggested that it may only provide 
efficient incentives in some industries, conventional wisdom assumes that it is 
generally efficient, providing a net public benefit by encouraging investment in 
innovation.10 In any case, while the patent system has always provided essentially 
identical incentives to inventors in all industries, the demographics of patent 
applicants and owners have changed over time. Originally, many patent applicants 
and owners were individual inventors, but for quite some time, the overwhelming 
majority of patent applicants and owners have been both for-profit and non-profit 
corporations. An increasing number of those corporate patent applicants and 
owners are academic institutions.11  
A.  Academic Patents 
Academics have always pursued patents on their inventions with varying 
degrees of success. But academic institutions did not meaningfully enter the patent 
business until the early 20th century, and even then, they did so only tentatively.12 
In 1925, the University of Wisconsin at Madison created the first university patent 
office, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, an independent charitable 
organization created in order to commercialize inventions created by University of 
Wisconsin professors. Similarly, in 1937, MIT formed an agreement with Research 
Corporation, an independent charitable organization, to manage its patents.13 Many 
                                                                                                                                        
United States Patent and Trademark Office also issues design patents and plant patents, and the 
United States Code provides for protection of vessel hull designs and mask works, both of which 
resemble design patents, all of these forms of intellectual property are outside the scope of this 
article. 
10 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008) (questioning the 
efficiency of the patent system); William W. Fisher, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A 
History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN 
VERGLEICH 255-91 (1999) (decrying the antitrust implications of intellectual property protection 
at the exclusion of innovation); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (observing that the patent system seems to 
provide efficient incentives in some industries, but not others); but see, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (concluding that the patent system is broadly 
justified). 
11 See generally JACOB ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (2016). 
12 See generally LESLIE, supra note 4; LOSS, supra note 4. 
13 Research Corporation was formed in 1912 by Professor Frederick Cottrell of the 
University of California to manage his own inventions, as well as those others submitted by 
faculty members of other educational institutions. See Frederick Cottrell, The Research 
Corporation, an Experiment in Public Administration of Patent Rights, 4 J. INDUST. & 
ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 846 (1912). 
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other schools followed MIT’s lead, and Research Corporation soon managed the 
patent portfolios of most academic institutions.14  
Before the Second World War, academic institutions engaged in very limited 
patent activity, collectively receiving less than 100 patents. But during the war, 
many academic institutions adopted formal patent policies, typically stating that 
faculty members must assign any patent rights to the institution.15 Gradually, some 
academic institutions began creating their own patent or “technology transfer” 
offices. But by 1980, only 25 academic institutions had created a technology 
transfer office, and the Patent Office issued only about 300 patents to academic 
institutions each year.16 
Since then, patent law has increasingly encouraged patent activity at 
academic institutions. Until 1968, each federal agency that provided research 
funding to academic institutions had its own patent policy. Some provided that 
inventions created in connection with federally funded research belonged to the 
federal government, others placed them in the public domain, and a few negotiated 
institutional patent agreements with academic institutions, allowing them to own 
patents in those inventions. In 1968, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare’s introduced an Institutional Patent Agreement, allowing for non-profit 
institutions to acquire assignment of patentable inventions resulting from federal 
research support for which the institution sought a patent. However, this policy 
was not uniformly applied. As such, in 1980, under pressure to respond to the 
economic malaise of the 1970s, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which 
enabled academic institutions to patent inventions created in connection with 
federally-funded research.17 Specifically, the Act provided that, with certain 
exceptions and limitations, “a small business firm or nonprofit organization” could 
patent such inventions, if the organization timely notified the government of its 
intention to patent the invention and gave the government the right to use the 
                                           
14 See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 130-35. 
15 By 1952, 73 universities had adopted a formal patent policy. By 1962, 147 of 359 
universities that conducted scientific or technological research had adopted a formal patent 
policy, but 596 universities reported that they conducted “little or no scientific or technological 
research” and had no formal patent policy. American Association of University Professors, 
American University Patent Policies: A Brief History, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/ 
files/ShortHistory.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
16 This increase in patent activity at universities between 1968 and 1980 is almost certainly a 
response to the Institutional Patent Agreement. See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 130-35; 
American Association of University Professors, supra note 15. 
17 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 
3019 (1980). 
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invention.18 The Act placed certain additional requirements on nonprofit 
organizations, providing that they could only assign their patents to an organization 
whose primary function is to manage inventions. Additionally, the nonprofit 
organizations must share any royalties with the inventor and use the earned 
royalties only for research or education. The limitation on assignment was intended 
to encourage academic institutions to assign their patents to charitable 
organizations, like Research Corporation, but in practice, it led many of them to 
compete over federal funds only to produce patentable inventions with little value 
or to assign their patents to patent aggregators or “patent assertion entities.”19 
At about the same time, the scope and duration of patent protection began to 
expand. First, the Supreme Court explicitly expanded the scope of patentable 
subject matter to include certain genetically modified organisms and computer 
software.20 Then, in 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, which  has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases and has 
adopted consistently pro-patent positions.21 In 1984, Congress expanded the 
patentability of pharmaceuticals.22 In 1994, Congress ratified the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations which created the World Trade Organization and extended the 
maximum duration of a United States patent from 17 years from the date of issue 
to 20 years from the filing date, marginally increasing the value of a patent.23 And 
in 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, which amended 
the Patent Act by, inter alia, moving from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file patent 
system.24  
                                           
18 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (2011). 
19 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611 (2008). But see Jonathan Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray? 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897728. 
20 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that patentable subject matter 
included genetically modified organisms); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that 
patentable subject matter included certain kinds of computer software); Patent and Trademark 
Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 301 and 
allowing universities to take title in the patentable results of funded research). 
21 See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (creating an 
appellate-level court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with the jurisdiction to 
hear patent cases). 
22 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984) (enabling generic pharmaceutical companies to develop bioequivalents to patented 
innovator drugs). 
23 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)). 
24 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP & ENT. LAW     [Vol. 7:1 59 
All of these changes in patent protection caused an increase in overall patent 
activity, across all types of inventors. 
TABLE 1: Patent Activity over Time 
Year Applications Granted Patents 
   
1980 104,329 61,81925 
   
1990 164,558 90,36526 
   
2000 295,926 157,49427 
   
2010 490,226 219,61428 
   
2015 589,410 298,40729 
   
   
 
That said, academic institutions played a role in the growth of nationwide patent 
activity directly related to the dramatic increases in patent applications and grants 
between 1980 and 2010. In response to these policy changes, many universities 
adopted a research model under which federal grants and other public funds were 
directed at the development of patentable inventions and discoveries, enabling the 
universities to obtain patents and claim a private benefit. By 1990, more than 200 
academic institutions had created technology-transfer offices, and the Patent Office 
was issuing more than 1,200 patents to academic institutions each year.30 In 1995, 
universities received over $15 billion in research grants from the federal 
government, a figure that would more than double—$35.5 billion—by 2013.31  
Ironically, while some of the patents granted to academic institutions proved 
extremely valuable, the overwhelming majority of them are worthless. Most of the 
technology-transfer offices created by academic institutions produce little revenue 
when compared with expenditures, and many actually lose money.32 In 2013, the 
median value among universities reporting revenues from their technology transfer 
offices was a mere $1.57 million; moreover, less than 1 percent of all patent 
                                           
25 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING 
TEAM, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS 1963 – 2015 (2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 130-35. 
31 ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS (AUTM) STATT DATABASE, 
www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/statt-database-%281%29/. 
32 See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 139-50. See also Joseph Friedman & Jonathan Silberman, 
University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, Management, and Location Matter?, 28 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 17 (2003); MOWERY, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 24-40. 
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licenses for patents held by universities and their technology transfer companies 
generate revenues reaching or exceeding $1 million.33 
B.  An Economic View of Patents 
The prevailing theory of patents is the economic theory, which holds that 
patents are justified because they solve market failures in innovation caused by 
free riding. In the absence of patents, inventions are “pure public goods,” because 
they are perfectly non-rivalrous and nonexcludable.34 Neo-classical economics 
predicts market failures in public goods, because free riding will prevent marginal 
inventors from recovering the fixed and opportunity costs of invention.35 Under the 
economic theory, patents solve market failures in innovation by granting inventors 
certain exclusive rights in their inventions for a limited period of time, which 
provide salient incentives to invest in innovation.36  
Patents may also cause market failures by granting inefficient rights to 
inventors and imposing transaction costs on future inventions.37 In theory, patent 
law can increase net economic welfare by granting patent rights that are salient to 
marginal inventors and encourage future inventions. In practice, however, patent 
law may grant rights that are not salient to marginal inventors and discourage 
future inventions. For example, patent law may cause market failures by 
discouraging marginal inventors from investing in innovation. 
The American patent regime has precipitated “arms race” and “marketplace” 
paradigms, both of which elicit firm behavior.38 In the first instance, the benefits of 
patent protection incentivize innovators to aggregate under the auspices of the firm 
model, thereby reducing the marginal cost to each innovator of producing 
patentable technology. The marketplace paradigm encourages innovation, or at 
                                           
33 See AUTM STATT Database, supra note 31; see also ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 139. 
34 See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351, 377 (1958). 
35 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 219-36 (1972); Francis M. Bator, The 
Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON.  416 (1956). 
36 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3, at 48-50 (8th ed. 2011). 
37 Because the benefits of patent protection disincentivize the inventor form further 
innovating the patented invention, patent law can be said to discourage innovation. This is 
because—from the time the invention is granted a patent—the inventor’s costs are sunk, meaning 
that the inventor must incur new development costs and secure a new patent in order to innovate 
under the patent law regime. See id. at 38-39. 
38 See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297 (2010). 
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least innovation likely to result in patent protection. Both paradigms, however, are 
subject to the results of the perverse incentives that the patent regime provides, 
specifically that of patent stockpiling and the rent-seeking behaviors of non-
practicing and patent assertion entities.39 
The right to exclude is perhaps the most important stick in the bundle of 
patent protection rights and may have the effect of stifling rather than promoting 
innovation.40 As the ubiquity of non-practicing and patent assertion entities in the 
patent market become commonplace, patent holdup, patent litigation, and patent 
thickets are common features of the modern patent marketplace.41 
C.  University Responses to Patent Policy Incentives 
From the perspective of the theoretical literature, innovation depends upon 
innovators receiving the benefits of their innovation; the regime that allocates these 
benefits to the innovator and thereby incentivizes innovation is the most efficient.42 
For universities, a majority of which relied on federal funding to support research 
and development of patentable innovation during the 20th Century, the patent 
                                           
39 Id. See also Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 1 (2011); but see David L. Schwartz 
& Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 425 (2014) (arguing that the debate over non-practicing entities should be reframed to 
focus on the merits of the lawsuits they generate, including patent system changes focusing on 
reducing transaction costs in patent litigation, instead of focusing solely on whether the patent 
holder is a non-practicing entity); Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: 
The Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on Non-Practicing Entities, 12 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
1 (2011) (centering on the difficulties faced by legislators in attempting to solve the patent troll 
problem and turns to the recent judicial activity related to patent law allowing for individually-
focused, closely tailored analysis is examined with an evaluation of four recent court decisions 
and resulting changes to the patent system). 
40 See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009). See also James 
Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions and the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 30 (2012) (noting that open source innovation is unusually vulnerable to patent 
injunctions); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on 
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2009); John R. 
Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 677 (2011); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012). 
41 See Chien & Lemley, supra note 40 (noting the unintended consequence of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), namely, the driving patent forces 
entities to a different forum, the International Trade Commission (ITC), to secure injunctive 
relief not available in the federal courts); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, 
and Antitrust Responses, 98 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009). 
42 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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regime did not substantially encourage universities’ entry into the patent market 
until the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.43 Descriptive research in this area 
suggests that the Bayh-Dole Act—which allowed universities to patent inventions 
developed in connection with federally-funded research—increased the number of 
university participants in the patent market.44 Some scholars have also attributed 
university technology transfer and patent title aggregation as being rooted in the 
Bayh-Dole Act.45  
                                           
43 See Brownwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005); 
U.S. PATENT AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY UTILITY PATENT 
GRANTS – CALENDAR YEARS 1969 - 2012, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ 
ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (examining the sources of patent 
growth in the United States since 1985, and confirming that growth has taken place in all 
technologies); Rosa Grimaldi, Martin Kenney, Donald S. Siegel & Mike Wright, 30 Years after 
Bayh-Dole Act: Reassessing Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL’Y 1045 (2011) 
(discussing and appraising the effects of the legislative reform relating to academic 
entrepreneurship); Elizabeth Popp Berman, Why Did Universities Start Patenting? Institution-
Building and the Road to the Bayh-Dole Act, 38 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 835 (2008); LESLIE, supra 
note 4; LOSS, supra note 4, at 224-25. But see Elizabeth Popp Berman, Why Did Universities 
Start Patenting? Institution-Building and the Road to the Bayh-Dole Act, 38 SOC. STUDIES OF 
SCI. 835 (2008) (noting that while observers have traditionally attributed university patenting to 
the to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, university patenting was increasing throughout the 1970s, and 
explaining the rise of university patenting as a process of institution-building, beginning in the 
1960s). 
44 David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The 
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by US Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980, 30 RESEARCH POL’Y 99 (2001) (examining the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on 
patenting and licensing at three universities—Columbia, Stanford, and California-Berkeley—and 
suggesting that the Bayh-Dole Act was only one of several important factors behind the rise of 
university patenting and licensing activity); see also Harold W. Bremer, The First Two Decades 
of the Bayh-Dole Act, Presentation to the National Association of State Universities and Land 
Grant Colleges (Nov. 11, 2001) (attributing the proliferation of technology transfer to the Bayh-
Dole Act). 
45 See, e.g., Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction between the University and Its 
Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent Infringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 
VANDERBILT J. ENTERTAINMENT & TECH. L. 473 (2010) (exploring the idea that a faculty 
member acting in the role of an academic researcher in the scientific disciplines should be 
viewed in the context of patent law as an autonomous entity within the university rather than as 
an agent of the university, and arguing that acknowledging a distinction between the university 
and its academic researchers would revive the application of the experimental use exception as a 
defense to patent infringement for the scientists who drive the innovation economy and 
encourage academic researchers to participate in transferring new inventions to the private 
sector); Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the Current 
University Invention Ownership Model, 38 RES. POL’Y 1407 (2009) (citing the problems with the 
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However, these developments point to the fact that universities may be 
responding to policy interventions—such as the extension of the duration of 
patents in 1995 and anticipation of the America Invents Act—and, in turn, 
affecting the patent landscape.46 Examples of these responses include shifting 
investment in research and development toward innovation sectors that are more 
likely to receive patent protection, particularly those with high renewal rates, and 
because the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) derives more revenue from 
these sectors, it has the incentive to grant applications from high renewal rate 
sectors.47 Additionally, researchers have noted that the patent regime does not 
privilege economic development through technological transfer, and may account 
for both the increase in patent litigation from non-practicing entities, such as 
universities, as well as rise in rent-seeking behaviors in patent licensing.48 
                                                                                                                                        
Bayh-Dole Act’s assignment of intellectual property interests, and suggesting two alternative 
invention commercialization models: (1) vesting ownership with the inventor, who could choose 
the commercialization path for the invention, and provide the university an ownership stake in 
any returns to the invention; and (2) making all inventions immediately publicly available 
through a public domain strategy or, through a requirement that all inventions be licensed non-
exclusively); Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 4 UTAH L. REV. 
1949 (2012) (submitting that universities need more “discretion, responsibility, and 
accountability over the post-discovery development paths for their inventions,” in order to allow 
the public benefit of the invention to reach society, and arguing that, because universities guard 
their inventions, the law should be designed to encourage their responsible involvement in 
shaping the post-discovery future of their inventions). 
46 35 U.S.C. §154 (1994); 125 Stat. §§ 284-341 (2011). 
47 See Kira R. Fabrizio, Opening the Dam or Building Channels: University Patenting and the 
Use of Public Science in Industrial Innovation (Jan. 30 2006) (working paper) (on file with the 
Goizueta School of Business at Emory University) (investigating the relationship between the 
change in university patenting and changes in firm citation of public science, as well as changes 
in the pace of knowledge exploitation by firms, measured using changes in the distribution of 
backward citation lags in industrial patents); Hall, supra note 43 (confirming that growth since 
1984 has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being concentrated in the 
electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries); Michael D. Frakes & 
Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical 
Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VANDERBILT L. REV. 67 (2013) (finding that the 
PTO is preferentially granting patents on technologies with high renewal rates and patents filed 
by large entities, as the PTO stands to earn the most revenue by granting additional patents of 
these types); Tom Coupé, Science Is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents, 28 J. 
TECH. TRANS. 31 (2003) (finds that more money spent on academic research leads to more 
university patents, with elasticities that are similar to those found for commercial firms). 
48 See Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and Economic Development: 
Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Agreements Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 397 (2003) (proposing that Congress amend the Bayh-Dole Act to provide 
guidance on how universities can enter into Cooperative Economic Development Agreements 
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University technology transfer forces academic institutions to make 
uncomfortable decisions about licensing and litigation.49 Many academic 
institutions have responded to this ethical dilemma by assigning their patents to 
patent assertion entities in order to obscure their relationship to those patents and 
avoid the obligation to enforce them.50 Despite universities’ status as charitable 
organizations, as patent owners they have a financial incentive to support their 
research and development enterprises by competing for federal grants, even if it 
results in patentable inventions for which there is little economic value and limit 
the use of the knowledge they generate by securing patent rights regardless of 
whether these inventions have economic value. Either of these scenarios 
exacerbates the cost of innovation.51 
D.  The University as a Firm 
In response to the changes in the patent law system between 1980 and 2011, 
especially the Bayh-Dole Act, academic institutions increasingly adopted a 
research funding model under which federal research grants and other public funds 
were focused on the development of patentable inventions.52 As previously 
observed, the total number of patents granted by the Patent Office steadily 
                                                                                                                                        
patterned after the Stevenson-Wydler Act's Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements); Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American 
University, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 1460-1461 (1998) (describing the inputs and outcomes of 
university assertion of intellectual property rights); Nicola Baldini, Negative Effects of University 
Patenting: Myths and Grounded Evidence, 75 SCIENTOMETRICS 289 (2008) (discussing how the 
university patenting threatens scientific progress due to increasing disclosure restrictions, 
changes in the nature of the research (declining patents’ and publications’ quality, skewing 
research agendas toward commercial priorities, and crowding-out between patents and 
publications), and diversion of energies from teaching activity and reducing its quality); Lemley, 
supra note 7 (illustrating that universities are non-practicing entities, sharing some characteristics 
with trolls but somewhat distinct from trolls, and making the normative argument that the focus 
should be on the bad acts of all non-practicing entities and the laws that make these acts 
possible); Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 JOHN 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623 (2011) (revealing similarities between the litigation 
behavior of universities and for-profit actors, as well as complex and varied relationships 
between universities, their licensees, and research foundations closely affiliated with 
universities). 
49 See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 150-67. See also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 5, at 24-40. 
50 See ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 150-67. 
51 See generally MOWERY, ET AL., supra note 5; Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & 
David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014); 
Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357 (2013). 
52 See, e.g., Baldini, supra note 48; Berman, supra note 43. 
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increased, and so did the percentage of those patents granted to academic 
institutions.53 Soon, participants in the patent law system began expressing 
concerns about entities that decreased the efficiency of the patent system by merely 
owning and asserting patents, rather than practicing them. Of course, academic 
institutions that own patents are non-practicing entities almost by definition, as 
they exist to create and disseminate knowledge, not produce commercial 
products.54 Even more troubling, many academic institutions assign most or all of 
their patents to patent assertion entities, the paradigmatic patent trolls. As a result, 
the way that academic institutions use patents presents a risk of creating “patent 
thickets that entangle rather than encourage inventors,” which is in tension with the 
charitable purpose of those institutions.55  
But how did these patent thickets sprout from the soil of the university? The 
behavioral theory of the firm may help explain why academic institutions 
responded to incentives created by changes in this way. Unlike neoclassical 
economics, which uses individual actors as the primary unit of analysis, the 
behavioral theory of the firm uses the firm itself as the primary unit of analysis. As 
a consequence, the behavioral theory of the firm provides better predictions of firm 
behavior with regard to output and resource allocation decisions. 
The field of organizational economics emerged in 1937, when Ronald Coase 
observed that firms emerge when the external transaction costs associated with 
markets exceed the internal transaction costs of the firm.56 Coase’s theory of the 
firm was revolutionized in 1963, when Richard Cyert and James March provided a 
behavioral theory of the firm, observing that firms consist of competing coalitions 
with different priorities responding to different incentives.57 
In the context of funded research, university patent activity can be read as 
the result of strategic firm decision-making regarding patent output and resource 
allocation decisions. In fact, the way that patent policy has bent toward rewarding 
university patent activity through conferral of rights is a direct result of lobbying 
and decision-making efforts by these universities with lawmakers—evidence of the 
                                           
53 See Hall, supra note 43. 
54 See Lemley, supra note 19. 
55 See POSNER, supra note 36, at 50. See also Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE 
L. J. 1 (2013). 
56 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
57 See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 
(Herbert A. Simon ed., Prentice-Hall Inc. 1963). 
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bidirectional interaction between universities and external influences.58 The 
behavioral theory of the firm suggests that academic institutions have responded to 
incentives created by patent law in a manner consistent with firm behavior.59 
Though heterogeneity of university patent activity does exist, at most intensive 
research universities, where decisions are made two ways—with executive 
administrators setting strategic goals for research which are then implemented at 
lower management levels—intense competition exists between intensive research 
universities to vie for patent rights and thus profit maximization. 
Increasingly, these universities have centralized and ceded title in patents to 
their foundations and technology transfer offices.60 As non-practicing entities, 
universities bear the transaction costs of developing patented inventions, but they 
transfer the transaction costs of bringing the invention to market to 
intermediaries—and get paid for doing so.61 As a consequence, the goal of a 
university is to satisfice rather than maximize results; firms typically focus on 
producing good enough outcomes, rather than the best possible outcomes, as a 
function of compromise among internal coalitions with different priorities.  
Thus, one could view increased activity immediately after the 
implementation of a policy conferring greater patent rights not as a random but as a 
very rational, profit-maximizing response. However, this activity presents issues 
when the firm actor is a university. Because academic institutions are necessarily 
non-practicing entities with strong incentives to assign their patents to patent 
assertion entities in order to extract their economic value—yet the research from 
which a patentable invention derives is funded largely by public, federal 
investment—the gray area which universities occupy through their patent activity 
makes clear that, while they might not be “patent trolls” as Mark Lemley argues, 
they certainly feed the patent trolls.62 
                                           
58 See LISA R. LATTUCA & JOAN S. STARK, SHAPING THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM: ACADEMIC 
PLANS IN CONTEXT 24 (2d ed. 2009) (modeling visually the interaction between universities and 
external influences such as governments). 
59 See Berman, supra note 43. 
60 See Bremer, supra note 44. 
61 JENNIFER A. HENDERSON & JOHN J. SMITH, ACADEMIA, INDUSTRY, AND THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: 
AN IMPLIED DUTY TO COMMERCIALIZE (2002), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.453.1958&rep=rep1&type=pdf (noting that such a duty transforms the academia-
industry relationship from the traditional view of disparate entities into a Congressionally-
mandated partnership, intended to advance technology and benefit the public). 
62 See Lemley, supra note 19. 
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This article aims to provide evidence of that very point. As scholars, like 
Jacob Rooksby, have observed: “[t]he accumulation, use, and enforcement of 
intellectual property by colleges and universities reflects choices to engage in a 
system that . . . takes knowledge and information that is otherwise subject to . . . 
public use and restricts it, by attaching private claims to it.”63 The result of these 
restrictions produced by universities’ firm behavior through their patent activity 
and transfer carries real consequences for innovation. While the effects of these 
consequences are uncertain, the inputs are fairly clear: the prospect of wealth-
maximizing motivates activity in university technology transfer.64 Yet, the 
relationship between universities’ wealth-maximizing foray into patent acquisition 
and its connection with patent policy changes, as well as the explanatory 
theoretical framework of the behavioral theory of the firm for this very sort of 
activity, have not been established heretofore. In the sections that follow, this 
article makes this connection with supporting empirical analysis.  
II  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Research Questions 
While academic institutions have responded to patent incentives in a manner 
consistent with firm behavior, the optimal firm response does not necessarily 
produce the optimal social outcome. Organizational economics predicts that firms 
will respond to external incentives by satisficing results consistent with the 
consensus of internal coalitions. As a consequence, firms may or may not respond 
to patent incentives in a manner consistent with the patent system’s goal of 
maximizing innovation. It follows that if academic institutions exhibit firm 
behavior in relation to patent incentives, they may satisfice internal coalitions at 
the expense of social welfare. In the context of university patent activity, this 
behavior could take the form of the pursuit of patent acquisition not because it is a 
wealth-maximizing or an economically efficient activity but simply because the 
regulatory conditions are preferable to pursue patent acquisition. 
This study asks whether and how changes in patent law have affected the 
patent activities of academic institutions. Specifically, it asks two questions: 
 
                                           
63 ROOKSBY, supra note 11, at 16. 
64 See Valerie L. McDevitt et al., More than Money: The Exponential Impact of Academic 
Technology Transfer, 16 TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION 75 (2014). 
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(1)  To what extent do universities change their patent acquisition strategy  
       in response to changes in patent law? 
(2)  To what extent do different kinds of universities respond differently to 
       changes in patent law? 
To answer these questions, this study analyzes data on the population of 
academic institutions that were granted one or more patents between 1969 and 
2012 in order to determine the impact of policy changes on university patent 
activity over this time.65 Notably, while future papers in this series may engage 
with such questions, this article does not determine whether academic institutions 
have responded to changes in patent law in a way that increases or decreases net 
social welfare. But it can help explain how academic institutions have responded to 
patent incentives and whether their responses are consistent with firm behavior, 
laying the foundation for future exploration of whether and how universities may 
play a role of increasing costs to innovation. 
B.  Data 
This study relies primarily on a valuable, albeit limited, dataset compiled by 
the PTO, which records the total number of patents granted per year to each 
educational institution in the United States between 1969 and 2012.66 Because of 
limitations with this data—for example, the data contain only one measured 
variable, the total number of patents granted to an institution in a calendar year—
this dataset had to be merged with other datasets to include more explanatory 
variables for each institution observation over the same length of time. 
Specifically, this study relied on the available data from the Classifications for 
Institutions of Higher Education, a Carnegie Foundation Technical Report, which 
was produced in 1973, 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2005, and 2010.67 Because the first 
three published Carnegie Classification reports—1973, 1976, and 1987—have not 
been digitized, the use of this data required the authors to hand-code the 
classification for each observation utilized in the analytical sample. 
                                           
65 See U.S. PATENT AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, supra note 43. 
66 Id. 
67 This study employs data from the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher 
Education, U.S. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY UTILITY PATENT GRANTS – CALENDAR YEARS 1973, 
1987, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2010, with years 1994, 2000, 2005, and 2010, 
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/downloads.php (last accessed Oct. 23, 2017). However, 
because the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education changed its classification standards in 
2010, the “basic” classification standard was used to impute these values for each classification 
observation from 2010 to 2012.  
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From the merged dataset, consisting of the full population of higher-
education-affiliated institutions that had been granted a patent between 1969 and 
2012, an analytical sample had to be drawn from this population to focus on the 
main university participants in the patent market: research universities; doctoral-
granting universities; medical, health, and engineering specialized institutions; and 
to a lesser extent, comprehensive universities; liberal arts colleges; and other 
specialized institutions, including schools of art, music, and design, as well as 
graduate centers, maritime academies, and military institutes.68 Due to the paucity 
of observations in the following subgroups, 31 observations from two-year 
colleges, corporate entities, and spin-off research institutes were dropped from 
analysis, preserving 591 university observations. Additionally, given that the 
University of California system does not differentiate patent activity by institution, 
choosing instead to have reported patent activity in the aggregate in the PTO 
dataset, it was removed from the analytical sample. 
Because the Carnegie Classifications attribute most administrative units to 
the parent institution, this study took the same approach, collapsing administrative 
units, foundations, other organizational entities, and former institutions on the 
current parent institution. However, each observation that received a separate 
classification from its parent institution in the Carnegie Classifications was 
preserved as a separate observation from the parent institution.69 The process of 
                                           
68 The “basic” Carnegie Classifications split Doctoral-Granting institutions into four 
subgroups: Research Universities I and II, and Doctoral-Granting Universities I and II. Research 
universities originally were considered the leading universities in terms of federal financial 
support of academic research, provided they awarded a minimum threshold of Ph.D.’s and/or 
M.D.’s. Doctoral-granting universities were originally conceived of as smaller operations, in 
terms of federal funding and doctoral production, but comparable in scope to the research 
universities. Next, the Comprehensive Universities I and II met minimum enrollment thresholds, 
offered diverse baccalaureate programs and master’s programs, but lacked substantial doctoral 
study and federal support for academic research. The Liberal Arts Colleges I and II were selected 
somewhat subjectively in the first several iterations of the Carnegie Classifications; this is 
particularly the case for Liberal Arts Colleges II, which did not meet criteria for inclusion in the 
first liberal arts college category but were not selected for Comprehensive University II, either. 
The Liberal Arts Colleges I included colleges with the most selective baccalaureate focused 
liberal arts programs. As for the specialized institutions, which are divided into nine categories, 
the medical, health and engineering schools tended to be stand-alone institutions or institutions 
affiliated with a parent higher education institution but maintaining a separate campus. Last, the 
“other specialized institutions” included in the analytical sample are drawn from schools of art, 
music, and design, as well as graduate centers, maritime academies, and military institutes. Id. 
69 As an illustrative example of collapsing an administrative unit on the parent institution, 
Washington University School of Medicine was collapsed on Washington University. This also 
applied to foundations and boards of regents, which were collapsed on the flagship institution, 
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collapsing on parent institution reduced the total number of institutions observed 
from 590 to 366 school observations, each with 44 year observations. 
C. Limitations 
It should be noted that the data are limited by two important factors: (1) a 
lack of explanatory covariates; and (2) a small sample of higher education 
institutions relative to the overall population of higher education institutions. In the 
first instance, because the year observations for each institution comprise a 44-year 
span, it is impractical to match each institution-year observation with rich, 
explanatory covariates over that time. Not even the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) collected comprehensive data on universities 
before 1993. As such, the Carnegie Classifications serve as a proxy for more 
detailed information about each institution during a span of years for which data is 
virtually impossible to find. Given that the Carnegie Classifications categorizes 
schools on the basis of its federal funding for academic research, production of 
doctorates, institutional selectivity, enrollment, and degree programs, the Carnegie 
Classification for each school makes an ideal proxy for a more complete set of 
explanatory covariates. 
As for the size of the analytical sample relative to the population of 
institutions of higher education receiving a Carnegie Classification since 1973, this 
population consisted of 1,387 universities—not counting theological seminaries, 
bible colleges and two-year colleges—while the analytical sample used in this 
study comprises 366 universities—26.39 percent of the population. However, 
because this study analyzes university patent activity relative to patent policy 
change, the analytical sample size is necessarily limited to only those universities 
that have been granted a patent. As such, the analytical sample used in this study 
can be viewed as representing a nearly complete picture of the population of 
academic institutions that have successfully engaged in patent activity between 
1969 and 2012. 
                                                                                                                                        
given that the vast majority of observations in this dataset are standalone or flagship institutions; 
for example, the University of Colorado Board of Regents and the University of Colorado 
Foundation are collapsed on the University of Colorado, given that no other institution from the 
University of Colorado system appears in the PTO dataset. Finally, independent institutions 
within the same university system were treated as different observations: the University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center is distinctly observed from the University of Texas at Austin or 
even the University of Texas at Dallas, the city in which the University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center is located. 
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D.  Descriptive Results 
Research universities and doctoral-granting universities dominate patenting 
activity and receive an overwhelming majority of patents granted to academic 
institutions.  
 
TABLE 2: Analytical Sample by Carnegie Classification 
Carnegie Classification Freq. Percent Avg. Patent Total 
    
Research I & II Universities 100 27.70 870.42 
    
Doctoral-Granting I & II Universities 77 21.32 193.23 
    
Comprehensive I & II Universities 118 32.68 26.10 
    
Liberal Arts I & II Colleges 34 9.41 27.29 
    
Specialized Institutions: Medical, Health, and Engineering 35 9.69 57.80 
    
Other Specialized Institutions 2 0.55 2.50 
    
Observations 361 100.00 178.52 
 
 
However, just under half of the analytical sample is comprised of research 
universities and doctoral-granting universities, which the Carnegie Classifications 
consider separate but component parts of its doctoral-granting institution category. 
The average patent totals for research universities dominate all other classification 
of institution and are over four times as large as the average patent total for 
doctoral-granting universities. While comprehensive universities account for the 
largest proportionate classification in the sample, the average patent total for 
comprehensive universities is among the smallest in the analytical sample. In fact, 
it is followed only by the smallest classification in proportion and average patent 
total—other specialized institutions. Medical, health, and engineering schools, 
while small in number, maintain considerable average patent totals, nearly 
doubling the patent totals of liberal arts colleges which account for about the same 
proportion of institutions analyzed in the analytical sample. Across all categories, 
universities that entered the patent market before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 
buoy patent totals. As such, given their high level of patent activity, the spline 
regression model results below will especially highlight early entrants as well as 
research universities, doctoral-granting universities, and medical, health, and 
engineering schools. 
E.  Research Method and Model 
This study employs a spline regression approach to identify how universities 
reacted to changes in patent policy at key points in time between 1969 and 2012. 
This method is very similar to using a difference-in-differences approach to 
compare the activity differences between two series of years separated by a point, 
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or knot, in time, where the intercept and slope vary before and after the knot.70 
Spline regression modeling necessitates that the location of the knots be set a 
priori in order to produce estimates of the non-linear relationship between the 
predictor and response variables. Doing this requires defining an indicator variable, 
using it as a predictor, but also allowing an interaction between this predictor and 
the response variable.71 The analytical model employed in this study is as follows: 
 
 
Thus, the expectation of the total number of patents granted to school i (PATi) in 
year t (yrt) is a function of: (1) a vector of the factors attendant to school i in year t 
as proxied by its Carnegie Classification (CCit); (2) a dummy variable for whether 
or not the school engaged in patent activity before 1980 (EEi); (3) a school fixed 
effect (Si); (4) the year indicator variable (yrt); (5) a dummy variable for the 
location of the indicator year between the critical spline knots (kc, kc-1); (6) the 
interaction of the indicator year and the dummy variable for its location between 
the critical spline knots; and (7) the random error term (eit). 
Spline knots were set at 1981 (k1), 1996 (k2), and 2010 (k3) to account for: 
(1) the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which incentivized universities to 
engage in patent activity by giving them title to inventions produced from 
federally-funded research; (2) the expansion of the patent protection duration from 
seventeen to twenty years in 1995; and (3) the introduction of the America Invents 
Act, which would pass into law in 2011 and change the right to the grant of a 
                                           
70 Stata FAQ: How Can I Run a Piecewise Regression in Stata?, UNIV. OF CALIF. LOS 
ANGELES INST. FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH AND EDUC. (2016), https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq/ 
how-can-i-run-a-piecewise-regression-in-stata/. Effectively, calculating the slope and intercept 
shifts by hand using spline regression rescales the variable “year” by centering it on the location 
of the spline knot. For example, the first spline knot (k1) is centered on 1981, with all years 
before it counting up to zero and all years after—but before the next spline knot—counting up 
from zero. Including the centered “year” variable in the regression equation also requires adding 
an indicator variable of the intercept before and after the spline knot. Because the model has an 
implied constant—the intercepts before and after the spline knot should add up to 1—the overall 
test of the model will be appropriately calculated by hand. To finish estimating the slope and 
intercept differences by hand, this regression approach requires the use of the “hascons” option, 
because of the implied intercept constant. Alternatively, the “mkspline” package in Stata 13 can 
be used to conduct this estimation. Both approaches were used and yielded substantially similar 
results. The estimates from using the “mkspline” command are reported below for ease of 
interpretation. 
71 James H. Steiger, An Introduction to Splines, STATPOWER (2013), 
http://www.statpower.net/Content/313/Lecture%20Notes/Splines.pdf. 
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patent from a first-to-invent standard to a first-inventor-to-file standard.72 The final 
spline knot was not set at 2012 for two reasons. First, because 2012 was the final 
year of observation in the data set, the spline regression model would not tolerate a 
post-2012 slope prediction without post-2012 data. Additionally, setting the knot at 
2012 would not account for the possibility that universities may have begun 
reacting to the policy before the effective date of the policy change, as this 
particular policy change was in the offing for several years before its eventual 
passage. 
From a theoretical perspective, the decision to specify the analytical model 
with year-after-the-intervention spline knots is defensible on the grounds that it 
allows an additional calendar year for universities to react to the policy 
intervention. However, to test the sensitivity of the model and the decision to set 
the spline knots one year after the policy intervention, the model was specified in 
multiple formats to include spline knots on the year of the policy intervention, one 
year before the policy intervention, and two years before the policy intervention. 
This sensitivity test was undertaken to ensure that the differences in slopes and 
intercepts throughout year observations were not evidencing a secular exponential 
curve. Although the year-of-the-intervention slopes and intercepts bore marginal 
similarities to the results discussed below, which are modeled on year-after-the-
intervention spline knots, there were significant differences between the year-after-
the-intervention slopes and intercepts reported below and those for year-prior- and 
two-years-prior-to-the-intervention. Thus, the year-after-the-intervention spline 
knot specification used in this study is preferable to other specifications, because it 
rules out the potential threat of secular trends. 
F.  Empirical Results 
To analyze the effect of the patent policy changes on university patent 
activity, the regression model provided in the section above was used to calculate 
both the intercept before and after the policy intervention as well as the slope 
before and after the policy intervention. Given that the model employed a fixed 
effect by institution, the regression results reported below can be interpreted as 
providing an estimate of the intercepts (I) and effects, or slopes (E) pre-
intervention, as well as the marginal intercept shift and slope change after the 
intervention for universities in the analytical sample. In the first regression table, 
                                           
72 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (permitting universities to take title in inventions and discoveries 
produced through federally-funded research); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (extending the 
duration of patent protection from seventeen to twenty years); 35 U.S.C. § 100(i) (2006) 
(changing the right to the grant of patent from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file). 
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Table 2, the results compare early entrants to non-early entrants, demonstrating 
stark differences between the two groups. 
 
TABLE 3: Knot Differentials (Intercept and Slope) Regular vs. Early Entrants 
 Regular 
Entrants 
Regular 
Entrants 
Regular 
Entrants 
Early 
Entrants 
Early 
Entrants 
Early 
Entrants 
       
(I) Pre-1981 0   2.674***   
 (0.00)   (0.813)   
(I) Post-1981 -0.338   1.416**   
 (0.268)   (0.571)   
(E) Pre-1981 0   0.137   
 (0.00)   (0.115)   
(E) Post-1981 0.192***   0.760***   
 (0.0146)   (0.0311)   
(I) Pre-1995  1.565***   9.523***  
  (0.273)   (0.581)  
(I) Post-1995  1.180**   4.763***  
  (0.460)   (0.979)  
(E) Pre-1995  0.0800***   0.395***  
  (0.0180)   (0.0384)  
(E) Post-1995  0.157***   0.546***  
  (0.0361)   (0.0769)  
(I) Pre-2011   4.215***   20.11*** 
   (0.224)   (0.477) 
(I) Post-2011   1.555   2.924* 
   (1.138)   (1.542) 
(E) Pre-2011   0.130***   0.559*** 
   (0.00964)   (0.0205) 
(E) Post-2011   0.211   1.581* 
   (0.516)   (0.819) 
       
Observations 2,816 2,816 2,816 5,412 5,412 5,412 
R-squared 0.097 0.095 0.094 0.172 0.170 0.167 
Standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Notably, the early entrants engaged in patent activity at a modest but steady 
rate, adding minimally to yearly patent totals and averaging 2.67 patents granted 
annually by 1980. In 1981, the intercept at this spline knot jumped by an average 
of nearly one and a half patents in a single year, with an accelerated slope adding 
to the average growth by three-quarters of a patent every year thereafter to 1994. 
By 1995, the intercept spiked again, this time by an additional 4.76 patents granted 
annually for early entrants, with even further accelerated slope gains to 2010. 
Finally, in 2011, thought they came close, the estimates lacked statistical 
significance at the p<0.05 level but indicated an added intercept bump and positive 
explosion in slope. The non-early entrant estimates, though mostly consistent with 
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the statistical significance of the early entrant estimates for the same periods, pale 
by comparison. The direction and statistical significance of the results for all early 
entrants are fairly consistent with estimates for the effect of policy changes at the 
1981, 1995, and 2011 spline knots among early entrants in the research and 
doctoral-granting universities classifications.  
The results provided in Tables 3 and 4 describe patent activity among early 
entrant research and doctoral universities, respectively. As Table 3 indicates, 
research universities achieve the greatest orders of magnitude of increased patent 
grants at the regression spline knots. Slope changes among this group are 
statistically significant (or very closely approaching significance in the case of the 
1995 spline), illustrating the differential response within group to the various 
policies while mitigating the influence of secular trends. 
 
TABLE 4: Early Entrant Research Universities 
Variables Intercept Int. Delta Slope Slope Delta 
1969-1980 (Beginning of Data) 105.1 -- -0.0523 -- 
[11 Years]     
1981 Spline & 1981-1994 104.5247 -0.5753 1.1277*** +1.180 
[14 Years]     
1995 Spline & 1995-2010 120.3125 +15.7878 0.8497* -0.278 
[16 Years]     
2011 Spline and 2011-2012 133.9077 +13.5952 7.5517*** +6.702 
[2 Years]     
2012 (End of Data) 149.0111 +15.1034 -- -- 
     
Observations Total: 3,696 Years: 44 Schools: 84  
R-squared 0.243    
Standard errors clustered by institution  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Doctoral-granting institutions maintained relatively flat—until 2011, when the 
slope dramatically and significantly changed—but exhibit consistent growth in 
patent activity around the spline knots. 
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TABLE 5: Early Entrant Doctoral Universities 
Variables Intercept Int. Delta Slope Slope Delta 
1969-1980 (Beginning of Data) 0.000 -- 0.0178 -- 
[11 Years]     
1981 Spline & 1981-1994 0.1958 +0.1958 0.1768*** +0.159 
[14 Years]     
1995 Spline & 1995-2010 2.671 +2.4752 0.1484 -0.0284 
[16 Years]     
2011 Spline and 2011-2012 5.0454 +2.3744 1.9604** +1.812 
[2 Years]     
2012 (End of Data) 8.9662 +3.9208 -- -- 
     
Observations Total: 2,420 Years: 44 Schools: 55  
R-squared 0.129    
Standard errors clustered by institution  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 compares the activity among these two early entrant groups in terms 
of patents granted. Before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, research 
universities engaged in steady, relatively flat rates of patent activity, averaging 
about four patent grants per year. In 1981, the intercept for research universities 
increased by an average of about two patent grants, significantly adding an average 
of more than one patent grant per year thereafter. In 1995, the research university 
intercept jumped over seven units but had a relatively stable slope before and after 
this time. While the limited data after 2011 do not tolerate statistical significance, 
research universities and doctoral-granting universities may have undergone 
another upward intercept shift, but more importantly, may have also undertaken a 
momentous slope shift, relative to all other slope shifts observed by category, in 
the years since 2011. 
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TABLE 6: Knot Differentials for Early Entrant Research & Doctoral-Granting Universities 
 Research 
Universities 
Research 
Universities 
Research 
Universities 
Doc. Granting 
Universities 
Doc. Granting 
Universities 
Doc. Granting 
Universities 
       
(I) Pre-1981 3.860***   0.999**   
 (1.195)   (0.485)   
(I) Post-1981 1.977**   0.531   
 (0.839)   (0.341)   
(E) Pre-1981 0.185   0.0725   
 (0.169)   (0.0686)   
(E) Post-1981 1.117***   0.241***   
 (0.0458)   (0.0186)   
(I) Pre-1995  13.78***   3.450***  
  (0.855)   (0.347)  
(I) Post-1995  7.302***   0.299  
  (1.439)   (0.585)  
(E) Pre-1995  0.569***   0.149***  
  (0.0564)   (0.0229)  
(E) Post-1995  0.787***   0.252***  
  (0.113)   (0.0459)  
(I) Pre-2011   29.54***   6.237*** 
   (0.702)   (0.283) 
(I) Post-2011   3.832   2.115 
   (3.568)   (1.439) 
(E) Pre-2011   0.822***   0.171*** 
   (0.0302)   (0.0122) 
(E) Post-2011   2.291   0.458 
   (1.620)   (0.653) 
       
Observations 3,256 3,256 3,256 1,584 1,584 1,584 
R-squared 0.255 0.253 0.248 0.170 0.168 0.174 
Standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Among early entrant comprehensive universities, only one spline knot 
approaches statistical significance—the knot at 1995—but even it represents a 
modest increase from preceding patent activity. 
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TABLE 6: Early Entrant Comprehensive Universities 
Variables Intercept Int. Delta Slope Slope Delta 
1969-1980 (Beginning of Data) 0.000 -- 0.0170 -- 
[11 Years]     
1981 Spline & 1981-1994 0.187 +0.187 0.0170 +4.77e-05 
[14 Years]     
1995 Spline & 1995-2010 0.4251 +0.2381 0.0484* +0.0314 
[16 Years]     
2011 Spline and 2011-2012 1.1995 +0.7745 0.0390 +0.342 
[2 Years]     
2012 (End of Data) 1.9804 +0.7808 -- -- 
     
Observations Total: 1,628 Years: 44 Schools: 37  
R-squared 0.072    
Standard errors clustered by institution  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Likewise, the statistical significance of the specialty institutions’—including 
primarily medical, health, and engineering schools—spline knot estimates is only 
present around the 1981 spline knot. Yet, the results clearly indicate a considerable 
bump at the 2011 spline knot, despite the lack of statistical significance at that 
spline or the 1995 spline. 
 
TABLE 7: Early Entrant Specialty Institutions 
Variables Intercept Int. Delta Slope Slope Delta 
1969-1980 (Beginning of Data) 8.594 -- -0.00429 -- 
[11 Years]     
1981 Spline & 1981-1994 8.5468 -0.0472 0.1447** +0.149 
[14 Years]     
1995 Spline & 1995-2010 10.5723 +2.0259 0.0626 -0.0821 
[16 Years]     
2011 Spline and 2011-2012 11.5745 +1.0018 1.3376 +1.275 
[2 Years]     
2012 (End of Data) 14.2497 +2.6752 -- -- 
     
Observations Total: 1,056 Years: 44 Schools: 24  
R-squared 0.091    
Standard errors clustered by institution  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is likely that these two groups of institutions—comprehensive universities 
and specialty institutions—demonstrate relatively little change with the passage of 
new patent policy for a couple of reasons. First, their numbers are few, especially 
when compared with research and doctoral-granting universities. Second, and 
perhaps more important, their missions are very different from research 
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universities.73 Thus, these universities may not respond to the same incentives in 
the same way as research and doctoral universities simply because research 
resulting in a patent may not be an institutional priority for many of the schools in 
the comprehensive and specialty institution categories. 
Notwithstanding these results for the comprehensive universities and 
specialized institutions, the statistically significant slope and intercept differentials, 
while controlling for explanatory covariates, indicate the strong presence of 
university patent activity responses among research and doctoral universities to 
patent regime changes at the years represented by the spline knots. There is 
considerable evidence that, among these two categories of universities, the passage 
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 provided considerable incentive, and elicited 
considerable effect, on the engagement of major universities in patent acquisition. 
The shrinking but still significant effect at the 1995 policy intervention, which 
extended patent duration to 20 years in some but not all patents, may be direct 
evidence that, because this policy change was not as major a shift in the conferral 
of rights to universities, it did not elicit the same magnitude of response. However, 
the anticipation of the passage of the America Invents Act triggered a massive shift 
in university patent acquisition, perhaps because universities were concerned that 
their inventions could be scooped under the new first-inventor-to-file standard.  
This behavioral pattern suggests a rational, profit-maximizing response—the 
result of strategic firm decisions regarding patent output and resource allocation 
decisions—to increase patent activity immediately after the implementation of a 
policy conferring greater patent rights. However, because universities do not bring 
these patents to market themselves, and so many of these patents are sold to patent 
assertion entities, the increase in university patent activity has the effect of 
contributing substantially to the patent thicket. 
CONCLUSION 
This study asks whether universities exhibit patent activity consistent with 
firm behavior. The results of the spline regression models suggest that research 
universities and doctorate-granting universities increase their patent activity in 
direct response to incentives created by changes in patent law but may also 
strategically hold on to pursue patentable inventions until after the policy provides 
them more robust patent rights or protection. Most notably, across all university 
types, the Bayh-Dole Act accelerated patent activity once universities could take 
title in inventions produced from federally-funded research. As illustrated in the 
                                           
73 KRISTINA M. CRAGG & PATRICK J. SCHLOSS, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 3-25 (2017). 
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regression models and Figure 1 in the Appendix, this Act may have even 
incentivized research universities to disengage in patent activity prior to, and scale 
up patent activity just after, the passage of the act, in anticipation of the benefit that 
would be conferred upon them once the act had passed into law. As the patent 
protection duration expanded in the mid-1990s, the growth of patent activity at 
most universities in the analytical sample increased marginally, indicating another 
firm response to the patent law regime changes. Finally, preliminary results and the 
figures in the Appendix indicate that the anticipation of the America Invents Act 
may have had the largest impact in the rate of patent activity to date, evidence of a 
university patent activity response to protect current research against a more 
liberalized granting process.  
These responses, evincing a move toward patent aggregation by universities, 
may have lasting impact not only on the patent marketplace but also on innovation. 
Yet, patent aggregation, in and of itself, is not necessarily problematic. However, 
the symptoms of patent aggregation, such as patent hold-up and rent-seeking 
licensing behaviors, are detrimental to the promotion of innovation. Moreover, 
competition for federal funds that leads to the production of patentable technology 
of little economic value could evince another market inefficiency to which 
universities may substantially contribute.  
This study—the first in a series investigating how universities make 
decisions about their intellectual property, and whether these decisions redound to 
the public good—demonstrates that research universities, doctoral granting 
institutions, and specialized institutions respond strategically to patent policy 
changes in ways that carry profound consequences for innovation and the public 
good. It is clear that changes to patent policy are necessary to incentivize 
universities to reap the benefits of research and development of patentable 
technologies while promoting innovation. 
 
* * * 
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